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THE POST-SALE CONFUSION DOCTRINE: WHY THE
GENERAL PUBLIC SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN
THE LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION INQUIRY
Anne M. McCarthy*

INTRODUCTION

In its developing stages, trademark law focused primarily on ensuring that the use of similar trade symbols by competing merchants
would not confuse purchasing consumers.' Courts, however, recognized long ago the harm to the trademark owner that resulted from
limiting the scope of the confusion focus? Courts were particularly
concerned with protecting the owner's goodwill, and found it an
anomaly to allow parties to reap the benefits of others' efforts. 3 As a
result, some early trademark infringement decisions strained the inquiry by finding confusion in cases where the actual likelihood of confusion was quite slim.4 Opinions of this kind have been generally
criticized for being intellectually dishonest.5
* This Note is dedicated to my mom for her infinite support and encouragement.
I am grateful to Professor Hugh C. Hansen for his invaluable guidance.
1. See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition
§ 2:8, at 2-15 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter McCarthy 4th].
2. See, eg., Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (extending trademark protection beyond the then governing "same descriptive properties" test in favor of a standard that contemplated the loss of reputation of the
trademark owner); see also Jerome Gilson, Trademark Dilution Now a Federal
Wrong: An Analysis of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, at 3 (1996)
("[T]he [Yale Electric] case was an important step in the development of trademark
protection that went beyond the use of a similar mark on competing goods.").
3. See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S.
203, 205 (1942) ("If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol
[that a trademark owner] has created, the owner can obtain legal redress."); see also
Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches,
Inc., 221 F.2d 464,466 (2d Cir. 1955) ("Plaintiff's intention thus to reap financial benefits from poaching on the reputation of the Atmos clock is of major importance.").
4. See, e.g., Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 350-51, 364 (9th Cir.
1948) (granting injunctive relief against the use of "Stork Club" by an unsophisticated
tavern in a distant city in favor of the owner of a similar mark for a glittering New
York nightclub).
5. See, e.g., Note, Dilution Trademark Infringement or Vil-O'-The-Wisp?, 77
Harv. L. Rev. 520, 525 (1964) ("As the likelihood of confusion in any particular case
becomes attenuated, the operative role of dilution in prompting relief increases, however orthodox the language in which the decision is announced."); see also 2 J.
Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23.26, at 84-85 (1st ed.
1973) ("[T]he decision-maker has an immediate 'gut reaction' to the likelihood of
confusion between two conflicting marks, and the opinion written to justify this intuitive reaction is merely rationalization after the fact of decision.").
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These courts engaged in such analyses because the limitation of the
confusion theory offered the trademark owner insufficient protection.6
While the courts' objective may have been noble, the legal standard of
the day did not sanction the outcome.7 Even though Congress recognized the dual aim of trademark law as protecting the interests of both
the public and the trademark owner,8 this sentiment was not apparent
in early legislation. Under the Lanham Act of 1946, trademark infringement occurred only when the infringing mark was likely to confuse actual purchasers at the point of sale. 9 The legislation was
ineffective, though, because there was still confusion among the public
and injury to trademark owners' reputations.
When Congress amended the Lanham Act in 1962, deleting the
"purchaser" and "source of origin" limitations in the infringement section, the federal courts differed regarding the significance of the
amendment. Many courts interpreted the revision as evincing congressional intent to encompass and prohibit a greater range of confusion."° Some of these courts concluded, therefore, that the
amendment supports an infringement action based on post-sale confusion of the general public." Other courts construed the amendment
as supporting an action involving post-sale confusion of only purchasers or potential purchasers. 12 Finally, a number of courts, despite explicit legislative authority to the contrary, still limit protection to
circumstances
posing the risk of consumer confusion at the time of
13
purchase.
This Note argues that, in light of the dual aim of trademark law to
protect the interests of both the public and the trademark owner, the
use of a trademark likely to cause confusion among the general public
in a post-sale context should be actionable under federal trademark
law. Part I of this Note discusses the functions of a trademark and the
major policy rationales underlying trademark law. This part then outlines the history of trademark law in the United States and defines the
parameters of a trademark infringement claim. This part also sets
6. See Robert J. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 77 Trademark Rep. 177, 183 (1987) (stating that commentators likewise believed that the confusion standard offered inadequate protection).
7. In 1946, section 32 of the Lanham Act provided a cause of action for the use of
a registered mark in a manner "likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive
purchasers as to the source of origin" of the infringer's goods or services. Lanham
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 437 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1)(a) (1994)).
8. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
9. See supra note 7; see also Note, supra note 5, at 523 ("[I]t seems indisputable
that Congress confined protection under the [1946] act to circumstances posing the
risk of consumer confusion.").
10. See infra Part II.B.2-3.
11. See infra Part II.B.3.
12. See infra Part II.B.2.
13. See infra Part II.B.1.

1999]

3339

POST-SALE CONFUSION

forth the various aspects of the likelihood of confusion test. Part H
assesses the ramifications of the 1962 Lanham Act amendment on the
likelihood of confusion analysis. Part II also analyzes differing judicial
interpretations of the congressional measure. Part I identifies why a
likelihood of confusion analysis in a post-sale context should, in certain circumstances, include the general public. This Note concludes
that congressional intent and trademark policy favors prevention of
the post-sale confusion of non-purchasers.
I.

TRADEMARK LAW

This part provides the definition of a trademark, the purposes of
trademark law, and the elements of a cause of action required to successfully prosecute a trademark infringement claim.
A.

What Is a Trademark?

A trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof' used by a party to identify and distinguish its products
from those of another.' 4 The term "trademark" also denotes words or
symbols that identify services.' 5 The range of what can be considered
a trademark is vast;' 6 it can include words indicating brand names, 7

slogans,' 8 letters, 19 numbers, 20 colors,21 building shapes,

2

and

14. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).

15. See I McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 3:1, at 3-2. In his treatise, Professor McCarthy instructs that although the term trademark is commonly used to refer to the
symbol that identifies both goods and services, trade symbols are technically called
"service marks." See id. The definition of a service mark is "any word, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof... used ... to identify and distinguish the
services of one person... from the services of others .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
16. See J. Steven Gardner, Note, Trademark Infringement, Likelihood of Confision, and Trademark Parody: Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 28 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 705, 712-13 (1993) (listing a variety of trademark forms).
17. See, eg., Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (10th
Cir. 1987) (upholding "Jordache" as a brand name for jeans).
18. See, eg., Chemical Corp. of Amer. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433,436,
439 (5th Cir. 1962) (enjoining the use of a slogan similar to "Where there's life ...
there's Bud"); see also 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 7:20, at 7-28 to -29 (identifying
slogans as serving as marks).
19. See 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 7:9, at 7-12 (stating that "an individual
letter or a group of letters, not forming a recognizable word, can function as a mark").
20. See, eg., Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Kaye, 760 F. Supp. 25,27-29 (D. Conn. 1991)
(finding infringement of the "A.1" mark for steak sauce by the maker of "A.2" brand
meat sauce).
21. See, e.g., In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1122 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (holding registrable the color pink for fiberglass insulation upon proof of secon-

dary meaning because "'pink' has no utilitarian purpose, [and] does not deprive competitors of any reasonable right or competitive need").
22. See, eg., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 765-67, 776 (1992)
(affirming trade dress infringement judgment for the appearance and ddcor of a Mexican-style restaurant).
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scents.2 3 To qualify as a trademark, the symbol must be "distinctive";
i.e., capable of identifying the products or services that bear the symbol. 4 This is necessary to indicate to consumers that a particular
product comes from a specific source.25
Trademarks perform several protective functions.2 6 Besides serving
as an identification symbol, 27 a trademark signifies that any product
bearing the mark comes from or is controlled by a single source,28 and
that the goods are of an equal level of quality.2 9 Further, a trademark

is a primary feature in advertising.3" The preservation of these attributes benefits both consumers and trademark owners.3 '
Trademark law pursues two related goals: the prevention of consumer confusion and the protection of proprietary interests in trademarks.32 The first major principle of trademark protection is
23. See, e.g., In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1239-40 (T.T.A.B. 1990)
(approving trademark for scented yam); see also Moon-Ki Chai, Protection of Fragrances Under the Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine, 80 Trademark Rep. 368, 371-72
(1990) (arguing for the extension of trademark protection to fragrances).
24. See 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 3:1, at 3-2.
25. See Gardner, supra note 10, at 712; see also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) ("The primary and proper function of a trade-mark is to
identify the origin or ownership of the article to which it is affixed.").
26. See 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 3:2, at 3-3.
27. See id.
28. See id. The Lanham Act states that a trademark will "indicate the source of
the goods, even if that source is unknown." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
29. See 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 3:2, at 3-3.
30. See id.
31. The Senate Committee on Patents in its Report on the Lanham Act instructed
that:
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect
the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a
particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which
it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has
spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is
protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
This is the well-established rule of law protecting both the public and the
trade-mark owner.
S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274; see also I
McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 2:1, at 2-2 to -3 (identifying the two major reasons for
trademark protection as the concern for the interest of the public in not being confused and the trademark owner's "interest in not having the fruit of his labor misappropriated"). Professor McCarthy goes on to state that "there is also the policy of
encouraging competition from which the public benefits." Id. § 2:1, at 2-3.
32. See S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274; see
also Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 218 (1st Cir. 1989) ("The
injury in an infringement case is two-fold: to the trademark owner through loss of
good will and presumably profits and to the public because of confusion caused by the
similar marks."). A third policy underlying the protection of trademarks is protection
of competitors' interests in preventing a limitation on the availability of new marks.
See Stanley A. Bowker, Jr., Note, The Song Is Over But the Melody Lingers on: Persistence of Goodwill and the Intent Factorin TrademarkAbandonment, 56 Fordham L.
Rev. 1003, 1010 (1988). This third policy, however, is tangentially relevant in relation
to the other two policies. See id. at 1014 ("The competitor's interest in using a mark
occupies the place of a stepchild in the policy factor family.").
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predicated on preventing consumer confusion that occurs when a junior user3 3 adopts a mark confusingly similar to that used by a senior
user.' The importance of protecting the public from confusion is obvious.3 5 Absent protection for the exclusive use of trademarks, consumers would be unable to distinguish between related goods sold
under similar marks.36 Similarly, consumers may falsely associate37
goods bearing similar marks as being derived from the same source.
Consumers, therefore, "would be forced to re-educate themselves
with each purchase or possible purchase of a branded product."'
This outcome belies an important economic benefit attributed to
trademarks by increasing consumer search costs.39
The second major principle of trademark law is the recognition that
a trademark is a symbol of the goodwill associated with the owner's
goods or services. 4 This canon recognizes the trademark owner's interest in preventing the misappropriation of his efforts.41 A trademark owner's goodwill is often characterized by his investment of
time, energy, and effort that culminates in "commercial magnetism."42
More specifically, "'[g]ood will' is the best semantic term we have to
describe the consumer recognition or drawing power of a trade33. The term "junior user" "refers to a party who adopts and uses a trademark
similar or identical to a mark previously adopted and used by the senior user."
Michael J.Allen, The Scope of Confusion Actionable Under FederalTrademark Law:
Who Must Be Confused and When?, 26 Wake Forest L. Rev. 321, 321 n.3 (1991).
34. The term "senior user" "refers to the first party to adopt and use a particular
trademark in connection with its goods or services." Id.
35. See id. at 323.
36. See iL As Justice O'Connor has stated, trademark infringement "deprives
consumers of their ability to distinguish among the goods of competing manufacturers." Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982).
37. See Allen, supra note 33, at 323.
38. Id.
39. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective,30 J.L. & Econ. 265, 270 (1987) ("The value of a trademark is the saving
in search costs made possible by the information or reputation that the trademark
conveys or embodies about the brand (or the firm that produces the brand)."); Roger
E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights,and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly?, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 911, 931 (1990) ("A trademark would have zero
value in a world of perfect information because consumers could determine variations
in quality and performance among products at no cost.").
40. See 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 2:1, at 2-3.
41. See Courtenay Brian Allen, Note, Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc.:
Defining Use of a Mark and the Source of Confusion in Trademark Infringement, 49
Baylor L. Rev. 847, 856 (1997) (stating that trademark law seeks to "protect the trademark owner's investment of time, energy, and money").
42. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,205
(1942). As Justice Frankfurter asserted, "[i]f
another poaches upon the commercial
magnetism of the symbol [that a trademark owner] has created, the owner can obtain
legal redress." Id.; see also White Tower Sys., Inc. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating
Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937) ("Good will may be defined as the
favorable consideration shown by the purchasing public to goods known to emanate
from a particular source.").
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mark., 43 This trademark characteristic is so significant, it is considered a type of property that the owner has the exclusive right to
enjoy. 44
Likewise, courts recognize the "right of a trademark owner to control his product's reputation '45 by policing infringing uses of its mark.
A trademark owner, therefore, has a proprietary interest in preventing freeriding on its goodwill through the unauthorized use of a similar mark.46 Justice Frankfurter succinctly articulated the freerider
concept: "[T]he wrongdoer who makes profits from the sales of goods
bearing a mark belonging to another was enabled to do so because
he
47
was drawing upon the good will generated by that mark.
B.

Legislative History of Trademarks

In the United States, trademark protection developed in the early
nineteenth century as an offshoot of the tort of fraud and deceit, and
was known as "passing off" or "palming off."'48 Due to its origins,
early trademark infringement claims centered on the fraudulent intent
of the defendant, rather than the protection of consumers.4 9 By the
early twentieth century, however, courts shifted their focus from the
fraudulent aspects of5 0passing off to the effect of confusingly similar
marks on consumers.
In 1870, Congress enacted the first federal statute governing trademarks," but the Supreme Court struck it down in 1879 as unconstitutional. 2 Congress passed new legislation in 1881 that limited
43. 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 2:15, at 2-36.
44. See id. § 2:14, at 2-29; see also Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782,
786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (classifying the term "property" as the right to exclude

others). As one commentator instructed, "[flor the trademark owner, the chief value
of the mark lies in its ability to associate favorable experiences or impressions with
the product to which it is attached, not simply in its capacity to identify the source or
sponsorship of that product." Shaughnessy, supra note 6, at 184.

45. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir.

1976).

46. See Landes & Posner, supra note 39, at 270 ("If the law does not prevent it,

free riding will eventually destroy the information capital embodied in a trademark,
and the prospect of free riding may therefore eliminate the incentive to develop a

valuable trademark in the first place.").

47. Mishawaka Mfg., 316 U.S. at 207.
48. See 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 5:2, at 5-3 (tracing the development of
trademark law in Anglo-American common law). The tort of passing off consisted
"of one passing off his goods as the goods of another." Id.

49. See id. § 5:3, at 5-4.
50. See id.
51. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12 ("An Act to revise,
consolidate, and amend the Statutes relating to Patents and Copyrights.").
52. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879); David Klein, The Ever Expanding Section 43(a): Will the Bubble Burst?, 2 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L.J. 65, 65 n.2
(1993) ("[R]egulation of marks used in intrastate and interstate commerce was unconstitutional because Congressional power to regulate trademarks comes from the Commerce Clause, not the clause empowering the regulation of patents and copyrights
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registration to trademarks used in commerce with foreign nations and
the Indian tribes.5 3 In 1905, Congress enacted another trademark regulation statute that enabled registration of trademarks used in interstate commerce.5 4 This statute proved to be inadequate, however,
because it permitted registration of only fanciful and arbitrary
marks. 5 Finally, in 1946, Congress replaced the Trademark Act of
1905 with the Lanham Act,56 which is the statute currently in place.
C. Elements of a Cause of Action for Trademark Infringement
A plaintiff in a trademark infringement claim must prove that his
mark distinguishes his goods from those of another, and that the defendant's mark is likely to cause confusion.5 Sections 32(1)5' and
43(a)5 9 of the Lanham Act are especially significant in trademark infringement actions. Section 32(1) proscribes the infringement of a
federally registered mark,60 while section 43(a) embodies the principles of federal unfair competition law and provides a cause of action
for the infringement of an unregistered mark.6 1 For the most part, the
(U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)"); see also 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 5"3, at 5-6
(stating that "the Act of 1870 was short-lived ... [because the] United States Supreme
Court held... [it] unconstitutional on the ground that Congress's power to regulate
trademarks was limited to an exercise of the Commerce power").
53. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 502 (repealed 1946).
54. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (repealed 1946).
55. See 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 5:3, at 5-8.
56. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)).
57. See AJ. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that to prevail against an alleged infringer, the plaintiff "must show a valid
trademark and a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public"); Patricia J. Kaeding, Clearly ErroneousReview of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact. The Likelihood
of Confusion Determination in Trademark Law, 59 U. Chi. L Rev. 1291, 1292 (1992).
To prove trademark infringement: (1) Plaintiff must establish the validity of its mark,
which means that the public recognizes the plaintiff's symbol as identifying its goods
and distinguishing them from those of others. There are two ways to establish validity: (a) the plaintiff's trademark is inherently distinctive, or (b) the symbol has become distinctive through the acquisition of secondary meaning. (2) Plaintiff must
prove the infringement of its mark; i.e., that the defendant's conduct caused a likelihood of confusion among the relevant purchasing class. See 3 J. Thomas McCarthy,
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 15.1(B) (2d ed. 1984).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994). Infringement under Section 32(1) is determined
by whether the alleged infringer's use is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." Id. § 1114(1)(b).
59. Id. § 1125. Section 43(a) forbids the use "in commerce [of] any word, term,
name, symbol, or device .... or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... is likely to
cause confusion." Id.
60. See 3 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 23:1, at 23-8.
61. See id. § 23:1, at 23-8. Under section 43(a), the owner of an unregistered mark
must establish two requirements. See Jacqueline Pasquarella, Third Circuit Review"
Trademark Law-Confusion over the Likelihood of Confusion?: Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar (1993), 38 Vill. L. Rev. 1317, 1322 (1993). First, the owner must
demonstrate that the mark is sufficiently distinctive. See id. Marks that are either
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fundamental principles of trademark infringement are the same
whether the claim proceeds under either section 32 or section 43.62 A
cause of action under each section rests "on a likelihood
of public
63
confusion as to the source of the respective products.

The keystone of a trademark infringement action is the likelihood
of confusion test.' 4 The phrase "likelihood of confusion" is also used
to describe the standard of liability for trademark infringement under
state trademark statutes.6 5 Likelihood of confusion
is the probability
67
66
that an alleged infringer's mark is the legal cause, or cause in fact,
of confusion in the minds of potential consumers.6 8 Specifically, the
confusion inquiry centers on whether the public is likely to believe
that the 69infringer's product originates from or is endorsed by the
plaintiff.
arbitrary or fanciful, which are known as "inherently distinctive," automatically qualify for trademark protection. See id. A suggestive mark likewise qualifies for automatic protection. See id. A mark that is merely descriptive of the goods to which it is
affixed qualifies for protection, however, only if it has acquired secondary meaning.
See id. at 1322-23.
62. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of
Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 471, 476 (1997); see also Richard L.
Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of Confusion in Trademark Law § 1.4.B, at 1-15 n.43 (1995)
("For most trademark infringement purposes, Sections 1114(1) [§ 32] and 1125(a)
[§ 43] are now virtually coextensive except, of course, for the former's requirement
that the complainant own a registration.").
63. Dinwoodie, supra note 62, at 477 (footnote omitted).
64. See 3 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 23:1, at 23-6.
65. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 20 cmt. d (1995) ("The term
'likelihood of confusion' has long been used to describe the standard of liability for
trademark infringement in actions at common law and under federal and state trademark and unfair competition statutes.").
66. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.3, at 1-7 (defining confusion in the legal
sense as "confusion of source or sponsorship").
67. See id. § 1.3, at 1-10 ("Where there is confusion in fact, which is the proper
subject of a legal claim, it must be 'the direct and proximate result of an act undertaken by the defendant."').
68. See id. § 1.1, at 1-4; see also Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240,
1243 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that likelihood of confusion "exists when consumers
viewing the mark would probably assume that the product or service it represents is
associated with the source of a different product or service identified by a similar
mark" (citation omitted)); Sean H. Brogan, Who Are These "Colts?": The Likelihood
of Confusion, Consumer Survey Evidence and Trademark Abandonment in Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, Ltd., 7 Marq. Sports L.J. 39,
45 (1996) ("'Likelihood of confusion' can be defined as the probability that the accused infringer's mark is the legal cause, or cause in fact, of confused, mistaken or
deceived states of mind of potential consumers.")
69. See Brogan, supra note 68, at 45. Judge Learned Hand aptly summarized the
likelihood of confusion concept: "[R]elief always depends upon the idea that no man
shall be allowed to mislead people into supposing that his goods are the plaintiff's,
and that there can be no right or remedy until the plaintiff can show that at least
presumptively this will result." Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. Supp. 505, 50910 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); see also Brett Thomas Reynolds, Comment, Appellate Review of
Lanham Act Violations. Is Likelihood of Confusion a Question of Law or Fact?, 38
Sw. L.J. 743, 747 (1984) ("Likelihood of confusion involves both the right of the public not to be confused by dishonest competitors and the right of business owners to
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In determining likelihood of confusion, courts generally consider
several factors. Although these factors differ among the federal circuits,70 the traditional set of factors developed by the Second Circuit
in PolaroidCorp. v. PolaradElectronics Corp.71 is illustrative: (1) the
strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the degree of similarity between
plaintiff's and defendant's marks; (3) the proximity of the products or
services; (4) the likelihood that plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6) defendant's good faith in adopting the
mark; (7) the quality of defendant's product or service; and (8) the
sophistication of the buyers.72 Courts apply this test in cases involving
both competing and noncompeting products.73 The Polaroid factors
are not meant to be exhaustive; rather, they are helpful guidelines for
74
courts to follow.
Not all of the factors are relevant in any given case,
nor are they given equal weight. 75 Further, a trial court's findings regarding each factor are reviewed by appellate courts for clear error,
but the further determination of likelihood of confusion is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed de novo.76
benefit from the goodwill and reputation that their time and money have
established.").
70. The following cases set forth the factors considered by the Circuits: First Circuit, see Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l. Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 222 (1st Cir. 1989);
Third Circuit, see Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628,
637 (3d Cir. 1992); Fourth Circuit, see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.L & L Wings, Inc., 962
F.2d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 1992); Fifth Circuit, see Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann
Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1986); Sixth Circuit, see Homeowners Group,
Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1106 (6th Cir. 1991); Seventh
Circuit, see Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir.
1993); Eighth Circuit, see Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir.
1980); Ninth Circuit, see E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290
(9th Cir. 1992); Tenth Circuit, see Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Techs., Inc., 935 F.2d
1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1991); Eleventh Circuit, see Dieter v. B&H Indus. of Southwest
Fla., Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 326 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Jane C. Ginsburg et al., Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 428-29 (2d ed. 1996) (listing the cases that set
forth the factors by circuit).
71. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
72. See id at 495.
73. See Anthony L. Fletcher & Robert M. Kunstadt, Trademark Law Handbook
91 (1990 ed.).
74. See id at 90 ("Each [factor] is to be evaluated as to how it bears on the ultimate question of likelihood of confusion, and the court may have to take into account
other variables. . . . The factors are not the end-all of the determination, merely a
useful guide." (footnote omitted)).
75. See Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (applying likelihood of confusion factors but cautioning that "'[niot all these [factors] are
always relevant or equally emphasized in each case'" (alteration in original) (quoting
Modular Cinemas of America, Inc. v. Mini Cinemas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 578, 582
(S.D.N.Y. 1972))).
76. See Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1242 (6th Cir. 1991). The Courts of
Appeals are split on the appropriate appellate review standard for the likelihood of
confusion analysis conducted at the trial level. For a discussion of the differing applications, see Reynolds, supra note 69, at 752-63.

3346

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

Examination of the likelihood of confusion standard is a multi-faceted exercise. It requires scrutiny of the type of confusion actionable,77 the relevant population of confused persons, 78 and the relevant
time of confusion.79 The traditional type of actionable confusion in a
trademark infringement suit relates to confusion as to the source of
goods or services, known as "source confusion."8 " Courts confined
their inquiry to source confusion because of the express "source of
origin" language in the 1946 Lanham Act.8 ' Source confusion occurs
when "[a]n infringing mark confuses the consumer into attributing the
product to the wrong source."'8 2 This type of confusion often occurs
between marks affixed to competitive products.8 3 Nonetheless, likelihood of confusion of source may also occur when a similar mark is
used on unrelated and dissimilar products. 4 Further, in an action premised on source confusion, a consumer's knowledge of the exact
source is not required, provided the consumer identifies the goods as
emanating from only one source. 5
The next aspect of the likelihood of confusion standard requires a
determination of the relevant population. To be actionable, confusion
must occur in the minds of a relevant class of persons.8 6 Under the
Lanham Act of 1946, to establish trademark infringement, the plaintiff
had to prove that the infringing mark was "likely to cause confusion
or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of such
77. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.4, at 1-13.
78. See id. § 1.6, at 1-24.
79. See id. § 1.7, at 1-28.
80. See id. § 1.4.A, at 1-15 (defining "source" as "the entity which controls the
nature and quality of the product").
81. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 32(1), 60 Stat. 427, 437 (1946) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994)).
82. Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.4.A, at 1-15; see also Allen, supra note 33, at
325 (defining confusion as to source as "a mistaken belief that the junior user's good
or service originates from the source of the good or service marketed under the senior
user's mark").
83. See Allen, supra note 33, at 325.
84. See FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1124, 1172 (N.D. Ill.
1996) ("The fact that the products at issue may be 'very different' is not dispositive of
the issue of the similarity of the products in determining the existence of a likelihood
of confusion ....The issue is whether the products are the kind the public attributes
to a single source." (citation omitted)).
85. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.4.A, at 1-15; see also Mastercrafters Clock
& Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466
(2d Cir. 1955) ("[I]t matters not whether the customers know just who is the
source."). For example, few customers know that CREST toothpaste is made by
Procter & Gamble. See 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 3:7, at 3-15.
86. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.6, at 1-24; see also Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc.
v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1206 (1st Cir. 1983) ("If likelihood of
confusion exists, it must be based on the confusion of some relevant person . . .");
Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 843 (W.D. Pa. 1981)
("Clearly the likelihood of confusion cannot be considered in a vacuum, but must be
determined with respect to certain persons.").
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goods.""7 Because of the express purchaser reference, courts accordingly focused their likelihood of confusion examination on whether
actual purchasers were likely to buy a product bearing an infringing
mark while mistakenly believing it was the plaintiffs product.as
The final aspect of the likelihood of confusion examination addresses the relevant time of confusion. This timing element is closely
related to the class of persons likely to be confused." A purchaser,
for example, may be confused in a sale setting, while a user may be
confused in a post-sale environment. 9 Consequently, because courts
traditionally focused their analysis on the likely confusion of purchasers, the temporal element likewise involved a point of sale focus.9 As
a result of these likelihood of confusion elements, a trademark infringement action under the 1946 Lanham Act involved purchaser
confusion of source that occurred at the time of sale. 92
The state of trademark law was significantly altered in 1962, when
Congress enacted the first amendment to the Lanham Act. The principle purpose of the amendment was to correct typographical errors
and to clarify the meaning of various provisions whose language was
inconsistent or unclear. 93 Additionally, some revisions were designed

to effect procedural changes.9 4 Because many of the revisions were
administrative in nature, 95 the 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act
are sometimes described as the "housekeeping amendments."'9 6 The
congressional measure, however, did affect substantive changes in
trademark law.97 In particular, as discussed below in part H, the bill
has had a substantial impact on the likelihood of confusion inquiry.

H. Ti

1962 AMENDMENT TO THE LANHAM AcT

This part examines the substantive changes to the Lanham Act as a
result of a congressional amendment in 1962. This part also looks at

the various interpretations courts have given to the amendment.
87. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 32(1), 60 Stat. 427, 437 (1946) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994)).
88. See Allen, supra note 33, at 331 ("Prior to the 1962 Amendment, many courts
focused their likelihood of confusion analyses on whether purchasers are likely to
purchase the defendant's product while mistakenly thinking it was the plaintiff's.").
89. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.7, at 1-28.
90. See id
91. See Allen, supra note 33, at 330-31.
92. See 3 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 23:5, at 23-15.
93. See James F. Hoge, The Lanham Act's Housekeeping Amendments, 52 Trademark Rep. 1245, 1245 (1962).
94. See idUat 1246. Specifically, the amendment revised internal Patent Office
procedure and prescribed changes in the procedures to be followed by trademark
owners when dealing with the Patent Office. See id. at 1247-48.
95. See id. at 1248.
96. Id at 1246.
97. See id.
at 1248.
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A. Effect of the 1962 Amendment on Likelihood of Confusion
Congress amended the Lanham Act 98 to encompass and prohibit a
greater range of confusion.9 9 This congressional aim was achieved by
broadening the key definition of trademark infringement. °0 The revision expanded the type of confusion prohibited, the relevant population, and the applicable time of confusion.'' This section examines
the scope of these amendments.

1. Type of Actionable Confusion
The 1962 amendment significantly expanded the type of actionable
confusion considered under the likelihood of confusion test. In its
original form, the Lanham Act required that confusion be "as to the
source of origin" of the goods or services." ° In amending the statute
in 1962, Congress struck out the "as to source of origin" language.1 3
As a result, some courts interpreted the deletion as evincing congressional intent to proscribe the use of trademarks that are likely to cause
confusion of any kind."° These forms of confusion included confusion as to affiliation, sponsorship, or association, collectively referred
to as "sponsorship confusion."' 0 5 This type of confusion arises out of
98. See Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769 (1962) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (1994)).
99. See Allen, supra note 33, at 330-31.
100. See 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 5:6, at 5-14.
101. See id.
102. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, 437 (1946) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994)); see also Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.4, at 1-13 n.36,
1-15 n.43.
103. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.4, at 1-13 n.36.
104. See Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir.
1971) (construing the 1962 amendment as outlawing "the use of trademarks which are
likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers
nor simply as to source of origin" (emphasis added)); see also Marathon Mfg. Co. v.
Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting the 1962 amendment to "allow any kind of confusion in support of a trademark infringement action"
(citations omitted)); Boston Prof l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem, Mfg., Inc.,
510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[T]he act was amended to eliminate the source
of origin as being the only focal point of confusion.").
105. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.4.B, at 1-15; see also Boston Athletic Ass'n
v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 1989) (recognizing potential buyer confusion that
the plaintiff may have "licensed, or otherwise sponsored" the team emblem); Rodeo
Collection, Ltd. v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that a
"likelihood of confusion exists... when the consumer would be likely to assume that
the identified services are in some way associated with another service-provider");
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204-05 (2d
Cir. 1979) (holding that an X-rated movie would cause an association with the cheerleaders in the minds of viewers and that such an "association results in confusion").
Reverse confusion is another type of actionable confusion. See Kirkpatrick, supra
note 62. § 1.4.C, at 1-17; 3 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 23:10, at 23-28 ("In 'reverse
confusion,' customers purchase the senior user's goods under the mistaken impression
that they are getting the goods of the junior user."); see also Allen, supra note 33, at
328 (explaining that reverse confusion occurs when "the similarity of marks used by
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an erroneous belief that, as a result of the similarity of the parties'
marks, the junior user's goods or services are somehow affiliated or
endorsed by the senior user. 1°6 While sponsorship confusion normally
does not lead to a diversion of sales, 10 7 it does jeopardize the plaintiffs reputation and goodwill.'0 8 When this occurs, "[t]he infringer
may benefit from the trademark owner's goodwill, and that goodwill
may be tarnished by the inferior quality of the infringer's product."'' 9
In fact, the infringer is able to freeride on the goodwill of the plaintiff
regardless of the quality of the infringing goods.
The inference created by the 1962 amendment was confirmed in
1988, when Congress expressly included sponsorship confusion in the
infringement statute for unregistered marks." 0 As amended, the Lanham Act now includes confusion "as to the affiliation, connection, or
association" of sources, and as to "the origin, sponsorship, or ap-

proval" of goods."' The 1988 amendment codified the liberalized
likelihood of confusion interpretation given to the 1962 revision by
many courts.' 12 Indeed, the congressional record reveals that the infringement section was substantially amended "to codify the interpretation [the section] has been given by the courts."' 3
2. Relevant Population
Congress also enlarged the scope for determining the relevant confused person. To determine the range of the likelihood of confusion
inquiry, the relevant population of confused persons must be formuthe parties will cause the public to believe that the senior user's products emanate
from or are sponsored by the junior user"). For an extensive discussion on the reverse confusion doctrine, see Thad G. Long & Alfred M. Marks, Reverse Confihsion:
Fundamentals and Limits, 84 Trademark Rep. 1 (1994).
106. See Allen, supra note 33, at 325-26.
107. See Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir.
1987) ("[Clonfusion of sponsorship... occurs where the goods do not directly com-

pete. In this situation, the goods are unrelated enough that no inference arises that

they originated from the same source, but the similarity of the trademarks erroneously suggests a connection between the sources. .. ").
108. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.4.B., at 1-16.
109. ld.
110. See Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3946 (1988) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994)); see also Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1A.B, at 1-15 n.43
(citing cases utilizing the sponsorship confusion standard).

111. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
112. See Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem, Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that the 1962 amendment accomplished a "broadening of the protection afforded by the statute").
113. S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603.
This response displays how the judiciary is often the first to recognize and react to
changes in the marketplace in terms of trademark protection and how Congress will
at times follow suit with an amendment. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.4, at 1-13
("Judges and legislators have by turns outpaced or followed one another in expanding
[trademark] law's reach." (footnote omitted)).
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lated. 114 Based on the express reference to "purchasers" in the 1946
Lanham Act, courts limited their likelihood of confusion inquiry to
likely confusion among actual purchasers. 115 In amending the statute
in 1962, Congress omitted the word "purchasers" from the confusion17
section. 116 There are basically two explanations for the change."
The first explanation is that Congress sought to coordinate the sections" 8 of the statute because the term "purchaser" did not exist elsewhere in the Lanham Act."19 The second explanation is that Congress
intended to eliminate a possible
restriction on the types of people
2
whose confusion is relevant. 0
3. Relevant Time
Finally, the 1962 amendment led to an expansion of the relevant
time of confusion. Although the most commonly recognized form of
confusion is consumer confusion at the time of purchase,' 2' under the
amendment, confusion need not occur at the point of sale to harm a
trademark owner. 122 By omitting the term "purchaser" in the 1962
revision, Congress not only enlarged the relevant population, it also
expanded the temporal aspect of confusion. Specifically, the term
used to refer to the relevant group also denotes the appropriate temporal aspect of the confusion inquiry. '2 Thus, with the omission of
the purchaser limitation, confusion "may occur prior to or after
purchase.' 2 4 Pre-sale confusion'2 results from an infringing mark
that creates initial customer interest, even though the confusion is dispelled before an actual sale is finalized.' 26 Under the post-sale confusion doctrine, courts determine if third parties may be misled by
114. See Allen, supra note 33, at 321-22.
115. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.

116. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769. Similarly, Congress
struck out the word "purchasers" from § 2(d) of the Lanham Act so that it too would
state to cause "confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive." Id.
117. See Hoge, supra note 93, at 1248-49.
118. In 1962, Congress struck the term "purchasers" from sections 2(d), 16, 32(1)

and 45. See id. at 1248.
119. See id. ("[T]he reference to 'purchasers' is not found elsewhere in the Lanham
Act, e.g., Sections 1, 5 and 42.").

120. See Syntex Lab., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir.
1971) (stating that "Congress eliminated ... qualifying language").
121. See 3 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 23:5, at 23-15.
122. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.7, at 1-28.
123. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.

124. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.7, at 1-28. As the Sixth Circuit explained,
"[s]ince Congress intended to protect the reputation of the manufacturer as well as to

protect purchasers [through the 1962 amendment], the Act's protection is not limited
to confusion at the point of sale." Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir.

1991).
125. Pre-sale confusion is also referred to as initial interest confusion. See 3 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 23:6, at 23-17. For a detailed discussion on pre-sale confusion,
see Allen, supra note 33, at 339-44.
126. See 3 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 23:6, at 23-17 to -18.
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viewing items put to their intended use after purchase.

27

Post-sale

confusion is based on the notion that while a consumer may not be
confused at the time they purchase a product bearing an allegedly infringing mark, the consumer's use of the product is likely to cause
others to be confused. 128

The essence of this idea was first expounded in MastercraftersClock

& Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc.,' 2 9 a

1955 case involving state common-law unfair competition. In this
case, Mastercrafters had marketed a low-priced imitation of the senior
user's expensive atmospheric clock. 130 Although purchasers of the duplicate knew that they were buying a look-alike, observers could not
readily distinguish between the two once the clock was in a domestic
setting.131 The court found that even though the imitation did not
cause consumer confusion, it did produce confusion among the general public. 132 The court held, therefore, that Mastercrafters' conduct
was unlawful because the existence of an inferior product would result
1 33
in a loss of the original manufacturer's reputation or customers.

127. See Chai, supra note 23, at 373. For an extensive list of post-sale confusion
cases involving trademark or trade dress infringement actions, see Ann K. Wooster,
Annotation, "Post-Sale Confusion" in Trademark or Trade Dress Infringement Actions
Under § 43 of Lanham Trade-Mark Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1125), 145 A.L.R. Fed. 407
(1998).
128. See Allen, supra note 33, at 344-45; see also Academy of Motion Picture Arts
and Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1455 (9th Cir. 1991)
("Post-sale confusion occurs when consumers view a product outside the context in
which it is originally distributed .

. . .");

Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.7, at 1-30

("Postsale confusion occurs when prospective purchasers or others in the relevant
public encounter the marks after the goods have been purchased and put to their
intended use.");.
129. 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955). In fact, Second Circuit jurisprudence recognized
non-purchaser confusion as relevant at least as far back as G.H. Mumm Champagne
v. Eastern Wine Corp., 142 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1944), a case that involved a cheap domestic champagne's label that looked like the plaintiff's select French import. As
Judge Learned Hand cleverly observed:
[A]s an evening wears on, the label, and only a very casual glance at the
label, is quite enough to assure the host and his table that he remains as
freehanded and careless of cost as when he began. At such stages of an
entertainment nothing will be easier than for an unscrupulous restaurant
keeper to substitute the domestic champagne.
Id at 501.
130. See Mastercrafters,221 F.2d at 465.
131. See id. at 465-66.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 466-67. This early case demonstrates the notion that a trademark
owner has an interest in protecting its goodwill and reputation against the unauthorized use of its mark outside of the consumer confusion context. Mastercraftersdid not
involve consumer confusion; rather, it centered on public confusion and the exploitation of a trademark owner's goodwill. Accordingly, Judge Frank commented that:
[S]ome customers would buy [the] cheaper clock for the purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers'
homes would regard as a prestigious article. [Mastercrafters'] wrong thus
consisted of the fact that such a visitor would be likely to assume that the
clock was an Atmos clock. Neither the electric cord attached to, nor [Mas-
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Moreover, the Second Circuit found Mastercrafters' freeriding on the
goodwill and reputation of the original manufacturer to be offensive.13 1 In so doing, the Mastercrafterscourt implicitly recognized the
proprietary value that may develop in a trademark due to the efforts
of a trademark owner.
Congress facilitated federal recognition of the post-sale doctrine
with the expansion of the confusion test under the 1962 amendment.
The courts uniformly interpret certain changes in the amendment. 135
In particular, the courts agree that the 1962 revision increased the
type of actionable confusion. 3 6 Judicial decisions, however, continue
to disagree over the assessment of relevant population and the relevant time for confusion purposes.
B.

Different JudicialApproaches to the 1962 Revisions

As mentioned above, courts generally concur on the expansion of
the types of actionable confusion under the 1962 amendment to the
Lanham Act. 137 This consensus can likely be attributed to the emphasis placed by Congress's two-step revision of the Act, first, through the
omission of the "source of origin" language in 1962,138 and second,
through the explicit incorporation of sponsorship confusion in the
1988 amendment. 139 Courts are not in accord, however, concerning
the expansion of the relevant population and the relevant time of confusion that was brought about by the 1962 amendment. Some courts,
despite the 1962 measure, continue to limit their focus to the likelihood of actual purchaser confusion at the point of sale.' 40 Other
courts have adopted a post-sale inquiry, recognizing that the confusion of persons other than actual purchasers is actionable. Judicial
approaches toward classifying the appropriate population in terms of
post-sale confusion differ in basically two ways. Some courts interpret
the amendment as authorizing recognition of confusion among purchasers or potential purchasers.' 4 ' A potential purchaser is one who is
tercrafters'] name on, its clock would be likely to come to the attention of

such a visitor; the likelihood of such confusion suffices to render [the] conduct actionable.
Id. at 466.

134. See id. ("[Mastercrafters'] intention thus to reap financial benefits from poaching on the reputation of the Atmos clock is of major importance.").
135. See Allen, supra note 33, at 322.
136. See id. ("Courts have been substantially uniform in assessing the types of confusion prohibited by the Lanham Act.").
137. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
140. See Allen, supra note 33, at 332.
141. See id. at 331; see also Electronic Design & Sales, Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys.
Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[I]n the case of goods and services that are
sold, the inquiry generally will turn on whether actual or potential 'purchasers' are
confused.").
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considering a purchase because of a desire to buy a particular item. 42
Other courts, however, define the relevant population for post-sale
confusion purposes as the general public. 143 In addition to encompassing purchasers and potential purchasers, the general public classification consists of people who view others using the goods, but who
are not themselves contemplating an impending purchase."'
1. Analyzing Decisions Requiring Point of Sale Confusion of
Actual Purchasers
Despite the 1962 amendment to the Lanham Act, some courts confine the likelihood of confusion analysis to actual purchasers at the
point of sale.' 45 These courts expressly reject an after-sale confusion
focus." These decisions simply announce that the likelihood of confusion inquiry involves only customer confusion at the time of
purchase, not public confusion in the post-sale context. '4 7 For exam1 4 the plaintiff had
ple, in Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enterprises,

brought a trademark infringement action of its trademarks, "NIKE,"

"JUST DO IT," and swoosh symbol.1 49 The defendant marketed tshirts and sweatshirts with a "swoosh" design identical to the plaintiff's, but with the word "MIKE" instead of "NIKE."' 50 The defendant admitted that the purpose of adopting a similar symbol was to
cause confusion with the famous Nike mark among casual observers
142. See Shashank Upadhye, Trademark Surveys: Identi#.'ng the Relevant Universe
of Confused Consumers, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ. 549, 571 (1998);
see also 3 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 23:5, at 23-15 to -16 ("A potential customer is
one who might some day purchase this kind of product or service and pays attention
to brands in that market.").
143. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.6, at 1-25.
144. See Upadhye, supra note 142, at 571.
145. See Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376,382 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The
proper examination is not whether some people viewing clamshells in industry plants
might be confused, but rather whether consumers in the market for clamshells are
likely to be confused."); Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir.
1993); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1206
(1st Cir. 1983) ("If likelihood of confusion exists, it must be based on the confusion of
some relevant person; ie., a customer or purchaser."); Smithkline Beckman Corp. v.
Pennex Prods. Co., 605 F. Supp. 746, 751 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("[T]he inquiry into the
likelihood of confusion should center on confusion at the time of purchase."); American Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
("[I]t is buyer confusion that the Lanham Act addresses."); Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445,450 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[The trademark laws do
not protect against the possibility that a member of the general public might fall
under the mistaken impression that the companies are related.").
146. See Nike, 6 F.3d at 1229; Snithkline, 605 F. Supp. at 752 ("The inquiry into the
likelihood of confusion is directed towards the time of purchase.").
147. See Nike, 6 F.3d at 1229 ("We are dealing here with customer confusion when
choosing to purchase, or not purchase, the items, not public confusion at viewing
them from afar.")
148. 6 F.3d 1225.
149. See id at 1226-27.
150. See id. at 1227.
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in a non-sale setting.' 5 ' Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit, without explanation, declined to adopt the post-sale doctrine.- 2 Rather, the
court asserted that the confusion issue was limited to likely confusion
of customers, in terms of assessing both the timing element and the
relevant population. 1 53 Courts adopting this restricted confusion approach usually do not discuss the evolution of the likelihood of confusion standard. 1 54 Although some of the decisions explicitly recognize
that sponsorship confusion is actionable,' 5 the opinions do not
ad56
dress the impact of the omission of the purchaser limitation.
2.

Analyzing Decisions Requiring Confusion of Purchasers or
Potential Purchasers

In contrast to the point of sale approach, other courts have expanded the confusion inquiry to include purchasers or potential purchasers.' 57 These opinions often cite the 1962 amendment for
support, classifying the revision as a clarification rather than as a substantive change.1 58 These opinions construe the congressional mea151. See id. ("[Defendant] admitted that his 'whole point' was to give someone
viewing from a distance the impression that the shirt actually read NIKE.").
152. Id. at 1229. Although the Nike court explained that with a legitimate parody
the customer should be amused, not confused, the court opted for a circumscribed
relevant confusion population. See id. at 1228. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit determined that the inquiry was whether defendant's goods confused actual customers. See
id.
153. In finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of confusion as a
matter of law, the court focused on how involved the purchasing process was for the
defendant's products because the items were only available via mail-order. See id. at
1229-30. This discussion illustrates the limitation of the court's confusion analysis to
likely confusion of actual purchasers at the time of purchase.
154. See, e.g., Smithkline Beckman Corp. v. Pennex Prod. Co., 605 F. Supp. 746, 752
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (dismissing post-purchase confusion without citing statutory support
for this determination).
155. See, e.g., Nike, 6 F.3d at 1228-29 ("[Cjustomer 'confusion' need not be restricted to a mistake regarding the source of the goods; the court should also consider
whether the customer would believe that the trademark owner sponsored, endorsed
or was otherwise affiliated with the product." (citations omitted)).
156. See Upadhye, supra note 142, at 566-67 ("Point of purchase confusion is the
most widely analyzed factor for determining when confusion occurs or vests. When
courts apply this approach alone, however, they act contrary to the intent behind the
1962 amendment to the Lanham Act .... ").
157. See Electronic Design & Sales, Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d
713, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[I]n the case of goods and services that are sold, the inquiry generally will turn on whether actual or potential 'purchasers' are confused.");
Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 222 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[I]nquiry
centers on whether there is likely to be confusion between the two marks among
perspective purchasers of women's canvas sneakers."); FASA Corp. v. Playmates
Toys, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1124, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("The relevant consumer group in
this case includes purchasers and potential purchasers. . . ."); Redken Lab., Inc. v.
Clairol Inc., 350 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (interpreting the confusion
doctrine to include potential purchasers to a degree).
158. In Redken, for example, the court expressed the following view of the 1962
amendment:
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sure as removing the distinction between actual and potential
customers only to the extent that the selection of particular types of
goods may differ depending on the kind of industry.1 5 9 Under this

approach, trademark protection extends only slightly beyond actual
purchaser confusion to include individuals who have engaged in the
purchasing process up to the point of finalizing a sale." In effect,
there is not much difference between this161posture and the stance generally adopted in pre-amendment cases.
For the most part, however, courts utilizing the potential purchaser
approach do interpret the 1962 amendment as facilitating a more significant expansion of the confusion test. In general, these opinions
acknowledge that the original statute explicitly limited consideration
of likely confusion to purchasers and, thus, by striking out the purchaser reference in 1962, Congress intended to ease this restriction. 162
Courts adopting this view usually rely on a legislative comment that
suggests that the confusion provision relates to potential purchasers as
well as to actual purchasers.' 6 3

Some opinions that endorse the potential purchaser approach assert
that a more expansive application of the likelihood of confusion test
injects an unwarranted dilution standard into the confusion section."64
For example, in Esercizio v. Roberts,'6 s a dissenting judge recognized
Congress merely sought to clarify the logical thrust of the Act-that when
products cross in the marketplace for consideration by a consumer the likelihood of confusion is to be determined not only with respect to those who
actually make a purchase, but also with respect to those who view the wares
with the prospect in mind of making a purchase.
Redken, 350 F. Supp. at 1305-06 n.10.
159. See id at 1305 n.10 ("Congress appeared only to remove the distinction between potential and actual consumers insofar as confusion in selection of goods may
be likely to occur in a particular trade.").
160. See Allen, supra note 33, at 354.
161. See id. (criticizing the Redken court for taking too narrow a view of the scope
of confusion).
162. See, eg., Electronic Design, 954 F.2d at 716 (stating that Congress deleted the
word "purchasers" from the statute to allow for consideration of potential
purchasers).
163. See S. Rep. No. 87-2107, at 4 (1962), reprintedin 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844,2847
("The purpose of the proposed change is to coordinate the language here with that
used elsewhere and to omit the word 'purchasers', since the provision actually relates
to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers."). For example, in Electronic
Design, the court relied on the 1962 congressional remark to assert that in the case of
goods and services that are sold, the appropriate inquiry is the likelihood of confusion
among actual and potential purchasers. Electronic Design, 954 F.2d at 716. As a result, the court articulated the correct analysis for such situations as whether there is
likely to be enough overlap of the respective buyers of the parties' goods to confuse
actual or potential purchasers. See id.
164. See, eg., Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority "misconstrues the scope of protection afforded
by the Lanham Act by ...

reading an anti-dilution provision into the language of

section 43(a)").
165. 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991).
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the prevention of consumer confusion and the protection of the trade166
mark owner's interests as the two main goals of trademark law.
Yet, the dissenting opinion contended that the protection accruing to
a trademark owner is merely derivative of and incidental to the goal
of preventing consumer confusion. 167 In criticizing the majority,
Judge Kennedy claimed that the opinion "does more than protect consumers against a likelihood of confusion as to the source of goods; it
protects the source of the goods. ' 168 As a result, the dissent maintained that the majority misconstrued the likelihood of confusion test
by identifying the target group as the public. 169 In addition, the dissenting opinion articulated that, in effect, the majority inserted an
anti-dilution provision into a trademark infringement action, and thus,
produced a remedy
that is contrary to the language and purpose of the
170
Lanham Act.

3. Analyzing Decisions Finding a Likelihood of Post-Sale
Confusion of the General Public
Although the potential purchaser approach recognizes an expanded
view of the confusion test, this interpretation in certain circumstances
may not be enough to protect the trademark owner. 71 Accordingly,
many courts assertively hold that a finding of likelihood of confusion
under the revised Lanham Act can include confusion of the general
public after purchase.17 2 The phrase "general public," for these pur166. See id. at 1249 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
167. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 1248 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 1248-49. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
170. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171. Post-sale confusion is not applicable in all trademark infringement cases because of the product at issue in a given case. For example, as the court explained in
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 631 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
"[t]he possibility of post or non-sale confusion among prospective purchasers is not a
significant factor in cases involving products which are not generally visible post-sale,
such as food products or toiletries ....

or where the mark in question is not highly

visible even if the product remains in circulation." Id. at 746 (citations omitted).
172. See Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 672 (8th Cir. 1996)
("[A]n action for trademark infringement may be based on confusion of consumers
other than direct purchasers, including observers of an allegedly infringing product in
use by a direct purchaser."); Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d
985, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying Tenth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit vacated the
denial of a preliminary injunction based primarily on pre-sale differences, and remanded with instructions to consider post-sale confusion); Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1245
("[11n this case.., members of the public, but not necessarily purchasers, were actually confused by the similarity of the products."); United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803,
808 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, which contains
the same confusion element as the Lanham Act, prohibits confusion among the public
at large); United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1350, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 1987)
(recognizing that although no one would buy cheap Rolex copies thinking they were
genuine, counterfeit Rolex watches created likelihood of post-sale confusion); Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting
the 1962 Amendment as allowing "any kind of confusion in support of a trademark
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poses, does not refer to society at large; rather, these cases typically
involve situations where ordinary observers are likely to be confused
by viewing the goods bearing the mark in question after they have
been put to their intended uses. Specifically, individuals may examine

the infringing goods believing them to be those of the senior user, and
find themselves disappointed with the quality of the item, which could

inhibit them from purchasing the genuine product. 73 This scenario
implicates the two main principles of trademark law: the protection of
the trademark owners' interests and the prevention of confusion. 74
The trademark owner's interests are affected by the potential harm to
its reputation that results from individuals believing that either the
infringing goods emanate from the trademark owner or that the defendant is somehow affiliated with the owner.175 The effect on consumer confusion generally occurs because, due to an unfavorable
impression, individuals may find themselves discouraged from acquiring the genuine item. 7 6 The effect is magnified when the infringed
infringement action"); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,
604 F.2d 200,205 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that an X-rated movie would cause an association in the minds of the viewers with the cheerleaders, and that "[tihis association
results in confusion"); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schultz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway
& Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975) (reasoning that even though customers
may know the difference between the products, the public may subliminally associate
the names, thereby causing confusion); Clinique Lab., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp.
547, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding a likelihood of post-sale confusion because point-ofpurchase displays and advertising did nothing to address the problem of post-sale
confusion of non-purchasers); Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200,
1216 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (finding that the placement of infringing t-shirts in the public
after sale would cause the public viewing the t-shirts to associate the shirts with plaintiff, thereby finding a likelihood of confusion regardless of whether the purchaser was
confused); Educational Testing Serv. v. Touchstone Applied Science Assocs., 739 F.
Supp. 847, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding a likelihood of confusion among schoolchil-

dren, the ultimate consumers of the infringed product); Nabisco Brands, Inc. v.

Conusa Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1287, 1291 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (finding a likelihood of postsale confusion because the similarity in the parties' candy would not be evident until a
consumer opened the candy); Lois Sportswear, 631 F. Supp. at 747 ("Because the
mark is consistently visible to the purchasing public as a constant advertisement of the
product on which an evaluation of it is affixed, the similarity of the marks in a postsale setting must be taken into consideration."); Rolls-Royce Motors, Ltd. v. A & A
Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 694 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (stating that the nonconfusion of purchasers does not preclude a finding of public confusion that results
when a product is put to its intended use). In Nabisco, Inc. v. PFBrands,Inc., No. 99
Civ. 0008 (SAS), 1999 WL 47313 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1999), Judge Scheindlin of the
Southern District of New York asserted that "[plost-sale confusion is undoubtedly
actionable." Id. at *1 n.3. Although the court's grant of a preliminary injunction was
based on a finding that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on its federal dilution claim,
see id. at *18, the opinion stated that the Goldfish crackers at issue in the case are
normally eaten from small plastic bags or bowls, rather than out of the packaging. See
id at *1. This reference indicates the court's concern over likely confusion among
non-purchasers.
173. See Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1244-45.
174. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
175. See Esercizio, 944 F.2d at 1244-45.
176. See id
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product is a prestige item because observers may develop the impression that the original product no longer possesses the renown it once
enjoyed.' 7 7 This situation, at least to a degree, deprives consumers of
freedom of choice in the marketplace.
The need to expand the relevant time of confusion to a post-sale
context can be demonstrated by conspiracy cases, i.e., when defendants attempt to persuade purchasers to participate in a conspiracy perpetrated against the public. For example, in A.T. Cross Co. v.
Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc.,'178 the defendant marketed its look-alike
"Cross" brand writing instruments by boldly attempting to convince
purchasers that their donees would think they were receiving a genuine Cross pen. 7 9 In imposing liability, the Second Circuit concluded
that non-purchasers could be confused by thinking that the infringer
was somehow licensed by the plaintiff to sell writing instruments
under a similar mark.' 80 This conspiracy theory is redolent of the Second Circuit's decision in Mastercrafters,where it likewise prevented
an infringer from freeriding on the prestige of the plaintiff and misleading the public.18 ' Because, in these collusive situations, the defendant acts in concert with the buyer, 8 ' traditional steps utilized in
trademark infringement cases
is inappropriate because the purchaser
83
is obviously not confused.'
This conspiracy theory often surfaces in cases involving imitation or
counterfeit goods. Courts in these cases generally glean congressional
intent for protection of non-purchasers by recognizing the evolution
of the Lanham Act."84 In particular, the opinions often cite the 1962
congressional measure that eliminated the source of origin and purchaser references in the statute. 185 These courts believe that, based on
the congressional alterations, confinement of the confusion inquiry to
purchasers undermines the effect of the Act. 8 6 In Rolex Watch
U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner,187 the court, in addition to referring to the 1962
amendment, 88 cited the "in commerce" clause of the infringement
177. See id.
178. 470 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972).
179. See id. at 692.

180. See id.
181. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
182. See David M. Tichane, The Maturing Trademark Doctrine of Post-Sales Confision, 85 Trademark Rep. 399, 414 (1995).
183. See Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 493 (S.D. Fla. 1986)

("The fact that an immediate buyer of a $25 counterfeit watch does not entertain any
notions that it is the real thing has no place in [the confusion] analysis.").

184. See id. at 492-95.
185. See id. at 492.
186. See id. at 493 ("This Court is of the belief that not only does the Defendants'
narrow view of the confusion question jar with the evolution of the Act, but also that
it serves to undermine the effect of the law.").
187. 645 F. Supp. 484.
188. See id. at 492.
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The court

reasoned that "[o]nce a product is injected into commerce, there is no

bar to confusion... occuring at some future point in time." 19'
Additionally, post-sale confusion analysis is often applied in cases
involving counterfeit goods under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act
of 1984.191 Congress incorporated the confusion standard of the Lanham Act into this criminal counterfeiting statute."9 Courts have interpreted the operative confusion requirement in the Counterfeiting
Act as applying to general public confusion, not simply confusion of
purchasers or potential purchasers. 193 In a counterfeiting case, a
counterfeiter often conspires with a purchaser to deceive the public.' 94
As one commentator explained, a "purchaser is in effect buying a
189. See id. A trademark infringement suit involving a federally registered trademark is governed by section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994).
Section 32(1) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who shall, without the consent
of the registrant ...use in commerce any reproduction... of a registered mark...
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive... shall be liable in a civil
action .... "Id.
190. Rolex Watch, 645 F. Supp. at 493.
191. 1984 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320 (1994)). The Act prohibits the intentional trafficking or attempted trafficking
ingoods or services bearing a counterfeit mark. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a). For a detailed discussion of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act and its legislative history, see
Brian J. Kearney, Note, The Trademark CounterfeitingAct of 1984: A Sensible Legislative Response to the Ills of Commercial Counterfeiting, 14 Fordham Urb. L.J. 115,
133-44 (1986).
192. In United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit found
that Congress desired to include the confusion requirement of the Lanham Act into
18 U.S.C. § 2320, and that it was successful in doing so. See id. at 805. The court
further instructed:
As stated by the chief House and Senate sponsors of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, likely "to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive,"
...is the key phrase in the remedial section of the Lanham Act... and its
inclusion here is intended to ensure that no conduct will be criminalized by
this act that does not constitute trademark infringement under the Lanham
Act.
Id. at 805 (quoting Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130
Cong. Rec. 31,673, 31,675 (1984)).
193. See id.at 805-08; United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Torkington,
812 F.2d 1347, 1351-53 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Infurnari, 647 F. Supp. 57,
59-60 (W.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Gonzalez, 630 F. Supp. 894, 896 (S.D. Fla.
1986).
194. See Tichane, supra note 182, at 414. Although the case of Role Watch, 645 F.
Supp. 484, involved a trademark infringement claim, the court's consideration of the
injuries that might ensue as a result of counterfeit goods is helpful:
Individuals examining the counterfeits, believing them to be genuine Rolex
watches, might find themselves unimpressed with the quality of the item and
consequently be inhibited from purchasing the real time piece. Others who
see the watches bearing the Rolex trademarks on so many wrists might find
themselves discouraged from acquiring a genuine because the items have
become too common place and no longer possess the prestige once associated with them.
Id at 495.
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close replica of a status product at a much lower price, intending to
pass it off as the genuine item while using, displaying, or wearing
it."' 95 These situations are particularly appropriate for utilization of
the post-sale confusion doctrine. In fact, the doctrine is critical for
safeguarding the status of the legitimate product and its manufacturer's reputation,
because no one doubts that the purchaser is not
19 6
confused.

The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Hon' 97 illustrates
the application of the post-sale confusion concept in a criminal counterfeiting context. In Hon, the court upheld a jury verdict that found
that the defendant violated the Trademark Counterfeiting Act by trafficking imitation Rolex, Gucci, Piaget, and Movado time pieces.19
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to consider a likelihood of confusion among the nonpurchasing public when determining if confusion was likely.199 Instead, the defendant maintained that the district court's jury charge
should have been limited to the likelihood of confusion among purchasers or potential purchasers.200 He argued that the confusion requirement under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act must be read
more narrowly than its Lanham Act counterpart.20 ' For support, the
defendant maintained that Congress intended to prohibit only egregious instances of conduct under the criminal statute. 2 2 While the
Second Circuit agreed with Hon's characterization of the congressional intent of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act,20 3 the court explained that the limitation is not measured by the status of the person
24
deceived, but instead based on whether the mark is a counterfeit. 0
Even though the Trademark Counterfeiting Act is narrower than the
Lanham Act provisions, Hon articulated that the legislative history of
the Trademark Counterfeiting Act supports the view that the reach of
the statute is public, non-purchaser confusion.20 5
195. Tichane, supra note 182, at 414.
196. See id. at 414-15.
197. 904 F.2d 803.
198. Id. at 804.
199. See id. at 804-05.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 805.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 805-06.
205. See id. at 806. The decision quoted instructive legislative history: "Congress
was concerned not only that '[t]rademark counterfeiting... defrauds purchasers, who
pay for brand-name quality and take home only a fake,' but also that 'counterfeiters
[can earn] enormous profits... by capitalizing on the reputations, development costs,
and advertising efforts of honest manufacturers at little expense to themselves."' Id.
(quoting S. Rep. No. 98-526, at 4-5 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3630-

31).
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The Second Circuit provided three rationales to support the public,
non-purchaser confusion standard."° First, the court explained that
its interpretation advanced the important policy underlying trademark
law of protecting a trademark owner's goodwill from freeriding by a
defendant." 7 Second, the court advised that courts in sister circuits
that have addressed the confusion requirement of the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act uniformly rejected the position posited by the defendant. "° Finally, the court found support for the broader confusion
standard in previous Second Circuit opinions interpreting the Lanham
Act. 0 9 These opinions construed the 1962 amendment as evincing
congressional intent to extend protection to confusion of any kind. 1
The court concluded, therefore, that "[b]ecause the purposes of the
trademark laws include protection of the integrity of the mark itself,
as well as prevention of consumer fraud, we hold that the 'likely to
confuse' standard of 18 U.S.C. § 2320 is not limited to purchasers or
potential purchasers."12 1' As one commentator surmised, "[a]lthough
the Hon decision was decided under the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act, the Second Circuit left no question that it was interpreting, at
least indirectly,
the scope of confusion actionable under the Lanham
2 12
Act.

As discussed above, there are generally three approaches the federal courts utilize for analyzing cases involving a likelihood of postsale confusion. The first approach limits the confusion inquiry to purchasers at the time of sale. The second approach focuses on the likely
confusion of purchasers and potential purchasers. The third approach
considers the likelihood of confusion of members of the general public
after purchase. As discussed below in part III, the general public approach best comports with the legislative and policy aims of federal
trademark law.
III.

WHY THE GENERAL PUBLIC SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
CONFUSION INQUIRY

This part examines the legislative and policy justifications for
courts' interpretation that the 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act
enabled the judiciary to prohibit confusion among the general public
206. See Allen, supra note 33, at 353 (identifying two of the rationales that the
Second Circuit offered for the Hon decision).
207. See Hon, 904 F.2d at 806 ("[Aln interpretation of section 2320's confusion

requirement to include the non-purchasing public advances the important purpose
underlying the trademark laws of protecting the trademark owner's investment in the
quality of the mark and his product's reputation ... .
208. See id at 807.
209. See id at 807.
210. See id211. Id. at 808.
212. Allen, supra note 33, at 353-54.
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after purchase, rather than just among purchasers and/or potential
purchasers.
A. Interpretationof Legislative Intent
1. Dilution/Confusion Distinction
While the argument that extending the relevant population to casual observers injects an anti-dilution provision 213 into trademark infringement may be shortsighted, it has nonetheless curried favor with
commentators. As a result, some commentators argue that post-sale
protection should not extend beyond potential purchasers, because a
broader construction would be tantamount to dilution and is therefore
unjustified. 2 4 This stance misses the import of the dilution concept.
In particular, "[c]onfusion and dilution involve 'distinct and inconsistent' states of mind. ' 215 A dilution claim is predicated on protecting
against the lessening of the capacity of a mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.216 Such a claim proceeds notwithstanding the
presence of confusion. 217 Conversely, a post-sale confusion claim involving non-purchasers does not eliminate the requirement that a
plaintiff establish confusion. In fact, a post-sale claim differs from a
traditional confusion claim only in terms of the temporal and relevant
population aspects of the confusion analysis.218 Admittedly, a typical
post-sale confusion decision often refers to dilution concepts. 21 9 Nevertheless, this does not offend any trademark precept. Rather, it appears that courts in infringement actions generally use dilution-like
213. See supra text accompanying notes 164-70.
214. See Allen, supra note 33, at 351 ("The Ferraricourt's grant of injunctive relief
is difficult to accept .... [Tihe court's reliance on a likelihood of confusion to find
infringement is improper, unless one takes the view that the Lanham Act protects
against confusion among the general non-purchasing public." (footnotes omitted));
William D. Raman, Ferrari-Can Dilution Be the Standardfor Likelihood of Confision?, 1 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 1 (1992) ("[T]he majority [opinion] looked to the
public as the relevant universe and essentially adopted a tarnishment or dilution test
for determining likelihood of confusion.").
215. Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.5.A, at 1-22.
216. See Frank I. Schechter, The RationalBasis of Trademark Protection,40 Harv.
L. Rev. 813, 825 (1927) (articulating the dilution concept as "the gradual whittling
away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name
by its use upon non-competing goods").
217. Section 45 of the Lanham Act sets forth the definition of "dilution" as the:
"lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of-(1) competition between the owner of
the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. III 1997).
218. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
219. See, e.g., Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting the
district court's findings that a mark was diluted in a discussion of point-of-sale confusion); see also Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.5.A, at 1-22 ("Many of the evidentiary
factors used in the analysis of likelihood of confusion cases also apply to dilution
cases.").
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language to underscore the trademark owners' proprietary interests,
which is one of the basic underpinnings of trademark protection2 20
A trademark infringement claim based on post-sale confusion
should not succeed in the absence of confusion. Even in jurisdictions
that prohibit confusion among non-purchasers, the facts of a particular case often render the doctrine inapplicable because confusion is
not likely. For instance, in Munsingivear Inc. v. Jockey International
Inc.,1 1 the plaintiff had sought an injunction to protect the distinctive
design of its men's underwear.m In rejecting the plaintiff's post-sale
confusion claim, the court explained that the inherently concealed nature of undergarments diminished the concern that non-purchaser
might be confused.2' Yet in so holding, the court did not reject the
concept of non-purchaser confusion, but simply found the doctrine inapplicable to the facts of the case before it. Munsingwear demonstrates that although courts favor the protection of trademark owners'
interests, these courts will not do so at the expense of confusion.224
2. Lack of Congressional Qualification
If Congress intended solely to extend the likelihood of confusion
inquiry to include potential purchasers, it could have simply qualified
the existing "purchaser" limitation in the statute with the additional
phrase "potential purchasers." Instead, Congress omitted the purchaser condition entirely. Although a legislative comment refers to
potential purchasers, it does so in an offhanded manner. In fact, the
brief legislative history provides no guidance regarding the appropriate application of the revisions. ' As a result, there is no indication
of the appropriate consideration to be given to the vague phrase "potential purchasers." One commentator aptly described the ambiguity:
Linguistically, "potential customer" could mean anyone anywhere
on a probability-of-later-purchase continuum, from a person standing at a sales counter handing an item to a cashier who has not yet
220. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
221. 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146 (D. Minn. 1994).
222. See id. at 1147.
223. See id.at 1150.
224. Although some decisions by the Eighth Circuit are receptive to non-purchaser
confusion, see, e.g., Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663, 672 (8th Cir.
1996) (indicating that the likely of post-sale confusion among observers of an allegedly infringing product is actionable), Munsingwear illustrates that if the facts of a
particular case do not support a finding of confusion, a plaintiff will not succeed.
225. The Second Circuit, in United States v.Hon, 904 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1990), articulated this point: "[T]he Senate Report suggests that the amendment's purpose
was to make clear that the confusion requirement includes potential purchasers as
well as actual purchasers.... Still, nothing in the legislative history or the statute as
amended excludes from its reach public, nonpurchaser confusion ....Id. at 807 n2;
see also Allen, supra note 33, at 357 ("Unfortunately, neither the 1962 Amendment
nor any other legislative source provides or even suggests a definition of the ambiguous term 'potential purchaser."').
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rung up the sale, to a person as yet unborn who might conceivably
develop a need for the product.
As this observation illustrates, although Congress intimated that the
confusion inquiry should extend to potential purchasers, this remark
should not be applied too restrictively. Moreover, as another trademark scholar has noted, the broad wording of the amended Lanham
Act has led courts to conclude that "the statute protects at least potential purchasers in addition to purchasers. ' '227 Thus, absent some directive as to its appropriate scope, the potential purchaser phrase should
be used as a guideline not as a stringent limitation. Indeed, this may
suggest that Congress did not intentionally seek to express a potential
purchaser limitation.
Even if this analysis, in and of itself, does not sanction an expansive
view of the relevant population, recognition of the legal landscape at
the time of the amendment is instructive.228 Prior to the congressional
revision, many courts had already employed an expansive view of confusion.229 As Mastercrafters illustrates, courts of the day recognized
that a trademark owner could suffer injury from imitation products if
the non-purchasing public was likely to confuse the imitation with the
genuine product.230 Given that the amendment was characterized as a
clarification,23 ' it is reasonable to conclude that Congress referred
solely to confusion by design. Thus, because the statute speaks only of
confusion, a "purchaser or potential purchaser" approach to every
case may inject an unintended qualifying condition for testing
infringement.
3. Lack of Subsequent Congressional Action
Even if it could be successfully argued that the amendment was not
meant to encompass public confusion, Congress's subsequent reticence on the issue should be regarded as acquiescence. Based on the
1962 amendment, a plethora of courts have utilized the post-sale confusion doctrine to prohibit confusion among casual observers and
226. Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the Public Domain-With an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act of 1984, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1391, 1455 (1993).
227. Kirkpatrick, supra note 62, § 1.6, at 1-25.
228. See Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 844 (W.D. Pa.
1981) ("Although the findings [in G.H. Mumm and Mastercrafters]were made under
theories of unfair competition, they certainly were part of the legal context in which
Congress acted in adopting the 1962 amendment.").
229. See, e.g., Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955) (stating confusion of the general
public actionable); G.H. Mumm Champagne v. Eastern Wine Corp., 142 F.2d 499 (2d
Cir. 1944) (recognizing the relevance of non-purchaser confusion).
230. Mastercrafiers,221 F.2d at 466.
231. See Hoge, supra note 93, at 1245.
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members of the general public.232 Moreover, Congress was evidently
aware of this judicial interpretation.3 If Congress did not initially
intend an expansive construction of the confusion section, it is quite
significant that they have not since chosen to thwart the prevailing
judicial interpretation.
Indeed, in recent times, reaction to judicial decisions have often
lead to Lanham Act amendments.'
For example, in Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.," 5 the Supreme Court held that
the Lanham Act did not authorize an award of attorney's fees to the

prevailing party in a trademark infringement case. 36 In response to
the holding, Congress changed section 35 of the Lanham Act to allow
the award of fees in "exceptional" cases." 7

It has been over twenty-seven years since the decision in Syntex
Laboratories,Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co.,' the first decision to
interpret and apply the amended statute in a post-sale confusion context.239 In Syntex, the Second Circuit held that the 1962 revision was
intended to prevent confusion among the general public.240 Not sur232. See supra Part I.B.3; see also Tichane, supra note 182, at 399 (stating that the
post-sale confusion doctrine has spread to virtually every federal circuit and that it is
well-settled that the doctrine covers confusion among casual observers).
233. See The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission
Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors (1987)
[hereinafter USTA Report], reprinted in 77 Trademark Rep. 375, 378 (1987). The
USTA Report commented that, "a number of courts have viewed the deletion as evidence of Congressional intent to broaden the test for likelihood of confusion. Now,
they say, the Act is designed to prohibit confusion of any kind, not merely of purchasers or customers nor as to source of origin." Id, reprinted in 77 Trademark Rep. 375,
378 (1987) (citation omitted). Although the commission referred to the change as
inadvertent, and thus appeared to disagree with the purportedly expansive interpretation, it nonetheless did not recommend any congressional action. See id., reprintedin
77 Trademark Rep. 375, 378 (1987).
234. See id, reprinted in 77 Trademark Rep. 375, 378 (1987).
235. 386 U.S. 714 (1967); see also USTA Report, supra note 233, reprinted in 77
Trademark Rep. 375, 378-79 (1987).
236. Fleischmann Distilling,386 U.S. at 717-21.
237. See Pub. L. 93-600, 88 Stat. 1955 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117 (1994)). Another example of congressional reaction to a judicial decision was
the passage of the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127(2)), which nullified the "consumer motivation" test of genericness announced in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc. 684
F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit held that, in determining if a trademark
was generic, the purchaser's motivation for requesting the product was the crucial
test. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 303-04 (9th
Cir. 1979). Under this test, the court held that the famous MONOPOLY trademark
was generic and thus unprotectible. In response to clamor within the trademark community, Congress restored the traditional test of genericness, which is an assessment
of the primary significance of the term to the purchasing public, see 1 McCarthy 4th,
supra note 1, § 5:8, at 5-15 to -16, not, as the Ninth Circuit held, the purchaser's motivation for requesting the product by its mark, see Anti-Monopoly, 611 F.2d at 303; see
also 1 McCarthy 4th, supra note 1, § 5:8, at 5-15 to -16.
238. 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971).
239. See Tichane, supra note 182, at 403.
240. See supra note 104.
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prisingly, the Syntex rationale has continued to enjoy significant favor
in numerous judicial decisions.24 ' Yet, Congress has not attempted to
rectify the interpretation, which has been its practice when judicial
decisions run afoul of congressional intent.242 Perhaps Congress determined that a separate response to Syntex and its progeny was not
warranted, even if Congress thought the decisions differed from its
objectives. Nonetheless, Congress had a perfect opportunity to remove any misconception when it promulgated the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988,243 which it classified as "the first overall revision
of the Lanham Act."244 Indeed, a principal purpose of the bill was 245
to
update the trademark law to reflect present day business practices.
Thus, to borrow a rule of thumb from another area of the law, sustained statutory interpretation applied to unamended statutes should
be deemed to have received congressional approval.246 Based on this
theory, non-purchaser confusion should be regarded as an appropriate
measure of congressional intent.
4. Noteworthy Scholarly Reaction
Immediately after Congress's 1962 amendment, scholars interpreted
congressional intent as prohibiting confusion among the public at
large.2 4 7 In an article published shortly after Congress amended the
Lanham Act in 1962, James F. Hoge, the chairman of the Coordinating Committee of the United States Trademark Association
("USTA"),2 48 sought to explain the changes. He determined that the

revision of the confusion section did not alter the basic law of trademarks. 249 On the contrary, Mr. Hoge explained that the Lanham Act
clearly exhibits that the purpose of a trademark is to identify the products of its owner and to distinguish them from those of others, "not
just for purchasers, but for everyone., 250 Further, the article provided
a compelling explanation for the general use of the term "purchasers"
241. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 631 F. Supp. 735,
745 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting the interpretation of the 1962 amendment in the Syntex
case).
242. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
243. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3946 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(a) (1994)).
244. S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5578.
245. See id. at 5577.
246. See, e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967) (quoting a settled principle in tax law that long continued interpretation of statutes by the Treasury
are deemed to have received congressional approval and thus have the effect of law).
247. See Hoge, supra note 93, at 1245.
248. See id. at 1245-46, 1254.

249. See id. at 1248.
250. Id. In addition, the commentator noted that this view of trademark law is also

consistent with the 1905 Act. See id. He explained that although a section of the 1905
Act expressly referred to purchasers, the section also contained a reference to "the
mind of the public." Id.
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in trademark infringement decisions."5 ' It stated that instead of considering this reference as a definitive pronouncement of the relevant
population, it should be regarded as a generic allusion to the relevant
population 5 2 Specifically, Mr. Hoge aptly expounded:
If the courts refer to "purchasers" it is because of the necessity in
each case to identify the persons or group of persons if any, who are
likely to be confused by the use of different marks upon specified
goods. In many cases these would indeed be the purchasers or potentialpurchasers of such goods but the outcome of a particular case
does not depend on whether or not actual purchasers, as opposed to
other members of the public, are likely to be thus confused.

3

As a board member of the USTA, the entity that provided the report
and recommendation on the proposed amendments, Mr. Hoge was
well-positioned to assess the objectives of the revisions. 251 Consequently, his unequivocal view that the Lanham Act is meant to encompass non-purchaser confusion is persuasive.
B.

Policy Justification

Protection of the trademark owner's proprietary interest in its mark
also warrants a prohibition of confusion of any kind.5 Congress continuously recognizes the importance of protecting a trademark
owner's investment.5 6 Likewise, courts often fashion trademark relief with this objective in mind. For example, in W. W. W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co.,2- 7 the Second Circuit refused to grant injunctive
relief against a junior user who had expended a large amount of capital to build up goodwill in the mark at issue. 58s The Second Circuit
reasoned that an injunction would greatly harm the junior user, while
providing little benefit for the plaintiff.259 Under the circumstances,
251. See id. at 1249.
252. See id.
253. Il; see also Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d
665, 669 n.4 (8th Cir. 1987) ("In applying principles of trademark law, courts commonly refer to 'the consumer,' much like the references made to 'the reasonable person' in resolving questions of tort law.").
254. See Hoge, supra note 93, at 1245. Further, Mr. Hoge expressed satisfaction
with the committee's recommendations: "The work of the Coordinating Committee
demonstrated that negotiation-when patient and sincere---can lead to constructive
accomplishment." Id. at 1254.
255. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) ("This exclusive right was not
created by the act of Congress, and does not now depend upon it for its enforcement.
The whole system of trade-mark property and the civil remedies for its protection
existed long anterior to that act, and have remained in full force since its passage.").
256. See, e.g., 135 Cong. Rec. H1207, H1215 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989) (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier) ("For businesses, trademarks are a kind of badge of honor, and it
is important that their investments in those marks be protected.").
257. 984 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1993).
258. See id. at 570 ("After an expensive advertising campaign, Gillette's product
began to sell very well.").
259. See id.at 576.
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the court concluded that equitable relief was not warranted.26 Gillette demonstrates that courts are cognizant of the need to protect the
goodwill in a mark.
Trademark owners annually invest vast amounts of money to promote their trademarks and develop goodwill.26 ' These expenditures
are made to encourage the public to associate the marks with "high
quality, desirable products."262 The more successful a trademark
263
owner is in this endeavor, the more valuable a trademark becomes.
Although difficult to quantify, trademark valuations often play a sig264
nificant role in determining the stock price of its corporate owner.
Trademarks and the goodwill they symbolize, therefore, constitute significant proprietary interests. In fact, a trademark is more than simply
a symbol of goodwill, it is itself an instrument for creating goodwill.265
Confusion of any kind is a form of "trespass" against the owner
because his effort in developing an association with the mark is
thwarted. Because any instance of confusion jeopardizes the goodwill
cultivated by a trademark owner, confusion is contrary to the main
tenets of trademark law. This is the approach espoused by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Hon:266 "[T]o include the non-purchasing

public advances the important purpose underlying the trademark laws
of protecting the trademark owner's investment in the quality of the
mark and his product's reputation, one that is independent of the goal
'
of preventing consumer deception."267
CONCLUSION

By amending the Lanham Act in 1962, Congress evinced intent to
broaden the likelihood of confusion test in terms of the relevant universe. Based on the way in which Congress elected to revise the confusion section, and the policy rationales behind the measure, many
courts have adopted an expansive view of the relevant population.
These courts reason that the revision reveals Congress's intent to prohibit confusion of non-purchasers in a post-sale setting. This expansive view is justified by assessing the legal environment at the time
Congress made the revisions and by analyzing Congress's previous responses when judicial interpretations misconstrue legislative intent.
Further, this interpretation comports with the two main purposes of
260. See id.
261. See Gardner, supra note 16, at 705.
262. Id.
263. See John V. Tait, Note, Trademark Regulations and the Commercial Speech
Doctrine: Focusing on the Regulatory Objective to Classify Speech for FirstAmendment Analysis, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 897, 936 (1998).
264. See id. at 936-37.

265. See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition
§ 2.07, at 2-37 (3d ed. 1992).
266. 904 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1990)

267. Id. at 806.
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trademark law, which is prevention of confusion and protection of the
proprietary interests in a trademark. Although a relevant universe
consisting of casual observers is not appropriate in every situation,
through its 1962 amendment, Congress armed the judiciary with legislation that can be enlisted when the facts of a given case dictate.

Notes & Observations

